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Introduction
principal ways in which cyber war is imagined is as a cataclysmic and transformative event, which can be understood through the lens of apocalypse. The details of cyber war are described once this initial identity has been established, not before. This deductive rationale identifies cyber war as 'catastrophic' or 'apocalyptic', with its character inferred from this initial assertion of its nature. This is not to suggest those who promote apocalyptic interpretations of cyber war reached their conclusions in similar fashion-in most cases, the opposite is likely to be true-but this is how cyber war is often presented publicly by a wide range of politicians, policymakers, defence and intelligence personnel, computer security professionals and academics. Cyber war discourses are disseminated through the general intercourse of broadcast and online news media, in popular culture-including films, television, novels-and other elements of the new media ecology (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2010) . Explicit references to cyber war qua apocalypse are common but what we are seeking to identify is an apocalyptic aesthetic, a way of imagining and thinking cyber war rather than the overt framing of cyber war as apocalypse per se.
In the 1990s, information-technological apocalypse was something unleashed militarily on an adversarial Other. A 1995 Time magazine cover story on 'cyber war'-in our typology, cyber warfare-drew attention to the 'new Armageddons' to be inflicted on America's enemies through digital military means. The scenarios imagined by military planners resounded 'with almost Biblical force' as Washington 'visits upon the offending tyranny a series of thoroughly modern plagues' (Waller, 1995) . Today, the apocalypse is also within one's sovereign borders and, consequently, in one's own time. In the post-9/11 mindset, 'war' is something that can happen 'here' as well as 'there'. Strategic cyber war is couched regularly in awkward neologisms drawn from JudaeoChristian doctrines of the end-times: cybergeddon, cyberarmageddon, cybarmageddon, cyberapocalypse. A 'cyber-apocalypse', suggests one dictionary, is 'a cyber attack that could wreak havoc on the nation by bringing down critical information infrastructures ' (Schell and Martin, 2006: 78) .
The scale of such an event 'would make 9/11 look like a tea party' (The Economist, 2012) .
Their historical specificity is elided in their construction as discrete events, the frequency of which is always increasing (e.g. Herrera-Flanigan, 2013) , and which lead inevitably to cyber war.
The prophets who read these apocalyptic signs and pronounce upon them-the 'Cassandras of cyber warfare' (Rid, 2012: 6)-do not, like their religious counterparts, restrict themselves to specific dates and times upon which terrible events will occur, so have no need to excuse themselves from incorrect predictions; they can never be wrong. However, they do have in common their talents as 'masterful bricoleurs, skilfully recasting elements and themes within the constraints of their respective traditions and reconfiguring them to formulate new, meaningful endtimes scenarios' (Wojcik, 1997: 148) . The specific vectors of 'cyber insecurity' may change, and the timescales expand and contract, but the certainty in apocalypse does not waver. A degree of 'apocalyptic intensity' is maintained and can be heightened further by making predictions that are 'imminent but indeterminate', legitimising a constant state of readiness in which adherents 'feel themselves to be standing poised on the brink of time' (Bromley, 1997: 36) . In fact, it is always 'only a matter of time' before a 'cyber-apocalypse' occurs (Gable, 2010) . This uncertainty is shared with other forms of security, which thrive on a 'denotative imprecision …. simultaneous appeal to the hard and the vacuous, the precise and the imprecise …. vague generalities about everything and nothing' (Walker, 1997: 63) . The tension inherent in this epistemic polarity is partially resolved in the case of cyber war by reading the signs as corroboration of a deterministic 'script' of the future (Robbins and Palmer, 1997: 5) . When events and scenarios converge, the narrative of cyber war gains explanatory power in its own right. In periods of 'thickened history' like this, it becomes ever more difficult to comprehend these events-'to see the wood for the trees', as it were-and they become part of their own causal structure (Beissinger, 2002: 27) . In this case, the impression is that if cyber war is not already occurring, it very soon will be.
The initiation of the apocalypse is frequently reduced to the familiar digital motif of a finger hovering above the button or, in this case, positioned in readiness for a final, decisive mouse-click or emphatic keystroke. The former prime minister of Australia provides an excellent example of this symbolic genre: 'There was a time when war was begun with a shot. Now it can begin with the simple click of a mouse. A silent attack that you may never even know occurred until it all unfolds in front of you' (Rudd, 2011) . During the early Cold War, the image of the US president's finger poised above a 'nuclear button' became the standard symbol of military power available to the commander-in-chief (Strong, 2005: 34) but in an age of cyber war, the power to foment societal chaos is available to all:
as UK armed forces minister Nick Harvey warned, 'the finger hovering over the button could be anyone from a state to a student' (Hopkins, 2011) . The difficulties of representing cyber threats visually (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1165) partially explain the popularity of this imagery but like the nuclear case-for which substantial visual resources were available-there is semantic power in this reduction of immense sociotechnical complexity to a simple manual action (Plotnick, 2012) . Like the informational bits mediating the human will to prosecute these actions, the decision to proceed is also binary: on/off, yes or no. We might never know who hit us or why but this single physical act brings the future rushing catastrophically into the present, the moment of 'cosmic ecstasy' (Chernus, 1982) in which all apocalyptic predictions are validated. This suggests apocalypse is also an object of desire, something to be welcomed and, perhaps, brought into being (e.g. Cook, 2004) . Although eschatology is concerned with the end-times, apocalypse is not merely the end but also a beginning, a time of both revelation and transformation.
An apocalyptic belief in the transformation of the human condition through catastrophe informs the rhetoric of, for instance, the US-led 'war on terror' as much as it does the jihadism of those who prompted it (McLaren, 2002; Jackson, 2005: 103-105) . This applies even if the utopian ideal of delivering a world free of 'terror' is as unlikely as millennial Islam's dreams of a global caliphate (Gray, 2007) . They remain visions no matter how hard one strives to achieve them and are part of a 'catastrophic' strand of apocalypticism which pits good against evil and privileges dystopian and pessimistic views of human nature (Wessinger, 1997). Cyber war scenarios frequently express this catastrophic apocalypticism, yet these eventualities are not entirely unwelcomed. Cyber war as apocalypse is 'an illumination unveiled precisely at the very moment of the greatest darkness and danger' (Aho, 1997: 65), a light to dispel the night of political foot-dragging and insufficient cyber security. The catastrophic materialisation of the 'virtual' threat is the necessary catalyst through which to achieve this transformation. In this respect, apocalypse operates in its primary sense of 'revelation', a 'singular instant both revealing the meaning of the past and announcing the future' (Bousquet, 2006: 756) , in this case the political errors of the past and the sunlit uplands of a 'cyber secure' future.
Understood not only as catastrophe but as the moment of revelation and the wellspring of transformation, apocalypse need not be viewed in a wholly negative light. Millennial beliefs in a better future are not exclusive to religion and are amply demonstrated in scientific movements like eugenics, cryonics and space exploration, all of which share a conviction humankind can be transformed and improved through technology (Bozeman, 1997). The posthumanist movement, specifically in its attention to the coming 'technological singularity'-the 'rapture of the nerds' (Doctorow and Stross, 2012)-is overtly apocalyptic in orientation but also emphasises the positive social benefits an information-technological transformation will bring (DeLashmutt, 2006) . The technological singularity may be a violent rupture but not necessarily; it may, some argue, have happened already-we just didn't notice.
3 Apocalypse need not be catastrophic but can be 'progressive', affirming collective cooperation in bringing about earthly salvation ('progress') without the radical violence of divine retributive justice (Wessinger, 1997). These utopian and transformative impulses are in a long lineage of technoscientific thought, expressing secular rather than religious apocalypticism (Hughes, 2012). We must enquire further how apocalyptic cyber war is located with reference to this spirit of apocalyptic modernity and postmodernity.
Cyber War and Apocalyptic (Post)modernity
We might identify in the specific invocation of apocalypse as the omnipresent threat of existential (Han-Pile, 2010) and the 'end of history ' (Fukuyama, 1992) , modernity has provided multiple apocalyptic (and often misunderstood) pronouncements which announce the end of the order of modernity and the birth of a 'postmodernity' itself.
In 1902, the English writer and social commentator, H.G. Wells, addressing the Royal Institution, advocated the application of the scientific imagination to the problems of futurity. Specifically, he wished to dispel an impression of the future as 'a perpetual source of convulsive surprises, as an impenetrable blankness' (Wells, 1913: 21) , into which we project our dark fantasies and cultural forebodings. As a science fiction author, Wells might be impressed at the role the genre now plays in thinking imaginatively about futurity and security: imagination has become a formal resource, mobilised to generate security knowledge and to 'dispel secrecy and ignorance, compute risk and uncertainty, and prepare for surprise and novelty ' (Aradau and van Munster, 2011: 69-70) . Wells might be less sanguine about the scenarios conjured up by this process, however. Whilst acknowledging that science fiction can provide planners with useful creative frameworks for thinking about cyber security (Jagoda, 2012: 25) , it also frequently casts technology 'in a bad light ' (Silomon and Overill, 2012: 15) . Formally and informally, cyber war scenarios are, as a result of an historical paucity of comparable events, necessarily imagined, and they 'remain fiction, not to say science fiction' (Rid, 2013a: 4) . In common with the science-fictional leanings of contemporary security futurism generally, these predictions are distinctly dystopian and 'often very grim indeed' (Carr, 2010: 18) .
What happened to the positive social futurism conjured up by the science-fictional imagination at the beginning of the last century? According to Richard Overy, British intellectual culture was deeply affected by the cataclysm of World War I, which leached Victorian optimism and faith in social progress from the bones of a tired nation (Overy, 2009). Furthermore, this 'domestic malaise' was deepened by uncertainties about species survival, economic security and the fear of political extremism in a time of civilisational crisis, a dystopian atmosphere which so sensitised the British public that the 'escape into war' in 1939 was an apocalyptic release (Overy, 2009: 384) . After
Operation Barbarossa and, in the public imagination, El Alamein (Weinberg, 1994: 489) , Western citizens began to look forward to a world free of tyranny, an outlook that gradually soured as superpower enmity ossified in the Cold War, a metaphor which '[packed] together anxieties so intense that it had the power to represent and to create a whole world' (Gregory, 1989: 12) . In a world of superpower chest-beating and one-upmanship, the spectre of nuclear apocalypse understandably altered people's expectations of the future. Subsequent knowledge of our precarious ecological condition has served to consolidate and accentuate feelings of impending catastrophe, mobilised through apocalyptic imaginaries in discourses of climate change and environmental degradation (Swyngedouw, 2010) . Existential uncertainty mediated through the cultural construct of 'apocalypse' foments the revelation that breaks open the illusion of social progress and the Enlightenment telos.
Eschatological discourses of cyber war are perhaps symptomatic of this apocalyptic aesthetic but they also derive from a long-standing antipathy or ambivalence to the sociopolitical effects of technology. As scholars of the social construction of cyber security threats have observed, concerns about information technology are older than we sometimes recognise (Cavelty, 2008; Lawson, 2012 Lawson, , 2013 , even if they have taken on an urgency hitherto unprecedented in its global intensity. Disquiet about the 'information revolution' and its supposed benefits has, even before the last two decades of massive Internet growth, raised critical questions about the political basis of such claims (Webster and Robins, 1986) and identified the constraining logics instantiated by the ideology of the information revolution itself (Slack, 1984) . More radically still, enthusiasts for information technology by their own admission sit cheek-by-jowl (Kelly, 2010) with neo-Luddites (Kaczynski, 1995) as proponents of neo-vitalist interpretations of technology as possessive of its own autogenerative 'life force'. Under these conditions, in which technology is self-perpetuating, autonomous and somehow 'out-of-control' (Winner, 1977) , and in which technology is implicated in a wide range Cyber war may be immanent to postmodernity but immanence does not tell us when cyber war will occur, for which we require a more active intimation of tense than such vague futurity provides.
Cyber war discourses, however, do not do this. Cyber war may be immanent but it is also perpetually in abeyance. The existential aspects of cyber war are comparable in some respects to environmental discourses, particularly in their emphasis on catastrophe rather than crisis (Aradau and van Munster, 2011) and in their irreversibility (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009) . They differ in that cyber threats gain their potency from cascading failures developing rapidly from originary stimuli, in contrast to the gradual accumulation of environmental security issues to a threshold beyond which the frequency of significant events accelerates markedly. This difference 'establishes different modalities of urgency and hence different spaces for political intervention ' (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1164) . Cyber security presents a strong sense of temporality in 'cyber-doom' scenarios 'constructed as inevitable and imminent but perpetually postponed', thus ignoring increasingly extensive and visible cyber security measures (Barnard-Wills and Ashenden, 2012: 9). As strategic cyber war is currently a speculative concept only, so narratives of cyber war fulfil precisely this political function, particularly in furthering the allocation of resources to companies and institutions charged with cyber security and the prevention and prosecution of cyber war (e.g. BBC News, 2013), whilst also stressing the need for more security to postpone the inevitable.
Michael Dillon identifies the centrality of eschatology to the politics of security more generally. This is 'politics thought in the light of last things', which articulate both a sense of ending and of 'ends'-as in aims and desires-but also the beginning of a new politics (Dillon, 1996: 31) . Cyber war read as apocalypse marks the birth of a new cyber security future in which political order is transformed into one that takes full account of the exigencies of cyber security. But this future is not postapocalypse-the 'catastrophic threat-event of the dissolution of the temporal order of things'
(Dillon, 2011: 782)-but pre-apocalypse. Indeed, the central task of the politics of security is to constantly defer the apocalypse so that the future becomes not the infinity of Christian heaven (on earth, or otherwise) but a circumscribed-finite-future of infinite possibilities for the workings of
